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and disposal/water supplySocially sensitive regulation for water servicesJ. S. Bateman, M. Sohail and C. NjiruThe provision of essential services such as water and
sanitation may be considered a first step towards social
inclusion. The overall sustainability of water and sanitation
services also depends on social considerations. This paper
explores the relationship between the regulator and the
utility in the context of service provision for low-income
users. It presents a general background to regulation in the
water sector, along with some of the challenges faced by
governments and regulators when implementing private
sector involvement. Drawing upon the authors’
experience of water services management including
regulation and private sector participation (PSP) in the
water sector, the paper is based on a review of the
literature, discussion with relevant professionals and an
examination of a number of projects. The authors detail
the role of the regulator and identify recurring themes
relating to regulation and the poor. The shortcomings of
specific projects are highlighted not as criticisms, but in
the interest of sharing of knowledge and improving
services to the poor in the long run. The paper includes
suggestions on how regulation of water services could be
undertaken in a low-income environment. The authors
conclude that if water utilities are to perform in a socially
sensitive manner, appropriate regulatory regimes are
necessary.1. INTRODUCTION
Many policymakers now see private sector participation (PSP) in
water and sanitation as essential for improvement of efficiency
and effectiveness, through the introduction of competition and
profit motive in the sector. However, regulatory mechanisms
are necessary to ensure that the desired objectives of PSP are
achieved. Approaching, developing and then implementing
regulatory mechanisms involve challenges, particularly in
developing countries where the proportion of the poor is high
and serving the poor is therefore crucial.
Regulation, which comprises a combination of command-control
(stick and carrot) mechanisms and economic instruments
(penalties and bonuses), creates a regime in which the emerging
private sector performs effectively. It is a necessary component of
any sector reforms and PSP in monopoly services as it aims to
ensure the proper performance of obligations (on all sides) and
protection of customers. Water customers comprise a wide
spectrum of economic and social groups, each with differingWater Management 158 Issue WM4 Socially senneeds, expectations and financial circumstances. Although the
poor and other vulnerable customers may represent a small
proportion of the (existing) customer base, they warrant a
disproportionately large amount of regulatory attention if
they are not to be marginalised. It should also be noted that
low-income citizens comprise the majority of potential new
customers, as governments and utilities seek to expand the water
coverage in an attempt to meet the Millennium Development
Goals (MDGs) agreed by the international community.
The transition from public to private sector delivery of any
service changes the role of the public sector fundamentally. The
current thinking that is driving water sector reforms in many
developing countries is that the public sector should distance
itself from direct service delivery, but instead act as standards
setter, paymaster and supervisor of the private sector service
providers through contractual arrangements. The private sector
meanwhile assumes the public sector’s former role in service
delivery, the difference being that it must make a profit. Such
sector reforms necessitate setting up of regulatory institutions
that will supervise water service providers.
Setting up effective regulatory institutions and developing
regulatory capacity can take a long time. In many developed
countries, it has taken decades to develop effective regulation, yet
the severity of poverty is much less of an issue than in developing
countries.1 Several years are usually needed before the regulator
is able to amass sufficient information-gathering capability and
legal capacity to exert its influence effectively. In developing
countries, information on services to low-income areas, which
include many informal settlements, may be even harder to come
by. Thus, despite its high priority, achieving improvements in the
delivery of social obligations (such as serving the poor and
protecting the vulnerable) can take several years. Indeed, despite
the international attention directed at providing water and
sanitation services to the poor, developing effective regulatory
mechanisms to ensure that water utilities are financially
sustainable while providing services to the poor will undoubtedly
take a long time.2. A SUMMARYOF REGULATION
Modern incentive-based regulation embraces pricing, service
standards, future planning and long-term sustainability. It
combines incentives, penalties and periodic rebasing of the initial
contract conditions (licence) at the request of either party. Thesitive regulation for water services Bateman et al. 177
178regulatory framework may also include controlling abuse of
monopoly power and unfair discrimination between customers,
while at the same time encouraging efficiency.
Underpinning regulatory effectiveness (irrespective of the sector)
involves ensuring independence of action of the regulator and
the absolute separation of the roles of service provider, regulator
and political processes.
In the drive to attract private sector participation, the importance
and the true value of regulation can be underestimated. Private
involvement is defined inevitably by contracts and the early
regulatory regime invariably focuses on price-sensitive
deliverables such as investment activity, enforcing service
standards and payments to the private operator company. Only
when these fundamentals are in balance can regulatory attention
turn to protection of low-income groups.2.1. Scope of regulation
Regulation in the water sector is necessarily wide-ranging and
should cover all performance aspects of water services delivery.
For each of the services provided, i.e. water supply (including
water quality), wastewater (including environmental standards)
and storm water, regulation should include the following
(a) setting or adjusting service prices
(b) monitoring performance in key areas and making
interventions where necessary
(c) representing customers and taking up grievances with
service providers
(d) assessing quality and environmental performance through
monitoring and enforcement of standards
(e) representing national interests in connection with setting
appropriate and affordable standards of service and
determining an overall water and sanitation services
strategy.
The provision of water services encroaches upon other
governmental activities and responsibilities—public health, social
welfare, the environment and general economic development, for
example. In consequence governments may choose to combine
regulation of several activities under a single umbrella. This
facilitates an integrated approach to setting standards and fosters
a close link between performance standards and prices. However,
by definition such regulatory arrangements require considerable
institutional capacity and can become cumbersome and
bureaucratic.
Alternatively governments may create individual regulators for
separate sectors. In some cases regulatory separation exists even
within a sector, for instance by separating regulation of
environmental and health standards from regulation of prices,
standards and performance. While this approach may allow
individual regulators to focus on specific issues, in the water
sector it risks the pursuit of high-cost policies.
Finally where PSP is adopted locally on an ad hoc basis (for
instance, where an individual municipality engages a private
operator) regulation more closely resembles contract supervision
or management rather than sector regulation. Such local
regulators have to work within the ambit of other nationalWater Management 158 Issue WM4 Socially sensitivregulators in relation to activities such as environmental
protection, health or economic development. In these
circumstances the utility may face regulation by several separate
bodies.
To date water sector PSP in emerging economies has been
implemented mainly on a local basis at municipal or regional
level; hence this latter arrangement is more common. Arguably it
is less capable of dealing with complex issues such as protecting
poor customers than the single or cross-sector arrangements
described earlier.
As far as services to the poor are concerned, the scope of
economic regulation includes
(a) tariff setting through periodic price reviews or triggered by
significant changes
(b) performance monitoring, including financial, operational
and customer service issues
(c) payment of fees and incentives (or penalties) to the private
company
(d) ensuring that the contractual provisions are met
(e) taking regulatory actions in the event of performance
failure, including the settlement of disputes and termination
in extremis
( f ) monitoring service performance including expansion, new
supplies, environmental compliance and issues relating to
customer management or disconnection for non-payment.3. SETTING UP REGULATION IN A LOW-INCOME
ENVIRONMENT
This section identifies some of the key challenges faced by
regulators (or contract supervisors) in setting up and
administering PSP arrangements. Most of the cases relate to
concession or management contracts under which regulation is
effected locally through a contract framework as opposed to
national policy. The section draws out some recurring messages
from past projects and poses questions to a wider audience on
how the challenges influence provision of services to the poor.3.1. The process of creating a new regulatory body
The PSP contract becomes effective typically about two months
after the conclusion of negotiations and award and signature of
the contract(s), by which time the regulator must be up and
running. The time lag is needed to establish legally and enable
any joint ventures, to register the operating companies and to put
the financial infrastructure for operations in place. Depending
upon the scope and scale of the PSP, it is unlikely that two
months is adequate.
By commencement, the regulator should be constitutionally
established, legally enabled, adequately staffed and must have
sufficient capacity to supervise the contract effectively. PSP
arrangements usually require that most of the water utility’s
functions, staff and statutory obligations become the
responsibility of the private operator; hence transition and
ongoing operations are necessarily complex. Creating and
resourcing the contract supervisor (regulator) is correspondingly
demanding, particularly at inception. As a result, regulatory and
institutional arrangements can vary widely between utilities.e regulation for water services Bateman et al.
A large part of the regulator’s responsibilities involve
performance monitoring, payment certification and ensuring the
proper development of the water services infrastructure
(including extensions to provide services to low-income
communities). In many cases it may share these responsibilities
jointly with other government bodies such as a water
resources agency or a planning agency.
3.2. Information management
Initially the operator will command considerably more
information about the technical and commercial performance of
the water services systems than the regulator. It takes time for the
regulator to collect sufficient information to be on a level footing.
This initial imbalance (known as ‘information asymmetry’) is
widespread in all emerging regulatory regimes and can be
particularly detrimental in low-income environments. It arises
from the following reasons
(a) it can take two or three years (or much longer where assets
are run down or service standards very poor) to plan and
implement performance improvements
(b) the staff available to the regulator may be less experienced
in regulatory processes than those of the operator (who may
have considerable experience gained in similar contracts
elsewhere)
(c) the onus for data gathering and reporting rests with the
operator, while the regulator is confined to requesting and
reviewing reports
(d) the regulator can assess performance only at a macro level,
while the operator has access to management and
commercial information for local areas
(e) there is little consistent cost and performance data in
low-income environments, against which standards can
be set or performance assessed.
The authors’ experience of emerging regulatory regimes
worldwide suggests that it could take up to five years or
more before newly created regulators are able to acquire
sufficient information to make a significant impact on the
performance of operators or outcomes from the point of
view of customers.
The problem of information asymmetry hampered
regulatory effectiveness following water privatisation in the
UK in 1989. In this case it took some ten years of regulatory
monitoring, together with several political initiatives to
exert regulatory pressure effectively. The question that
arises is how can robust information on services for the
poor be collected more expediently to reduce
information asymmetry?
Private sector involvement in water services is growing rapidly in
low-income environments, with PSP projects under
consideration in Africa, Asia and Latin America. From the
regulatory perspective, the African Development Bank in
association with the Department for International Development
has established a pan-African utility performance-benchmarking
project. There could be merit in new regulators in Africa (and
in other regions) accessing information from that project
and developing a forum for sharing experiences. If this
proves valuable there may be merit in adopting similar
projects in other regions.Water Management 158 Issue WM4 Socially sen3.3. Relationship between regulator and
service providers
It is widely accepted that effective regulation is essential to
extract the full benefits of private sector participation in
delivering water and environmental sanitation services.
Such regulation requires a clear delineation of the roles and
responsibilities of customers, the regulator and the private
operator with transparent relationships between all parties.
Establishing these roles and relationships in an even-handed
manner, while preserving independence and ensuring fairness to
all parties can pose a particular challenge for the regulator. This
challenge is heightened where regulation concerns a small
number of single sector service providers. The regulators of such
single sector operators may be open to criticism from one party or
another for bias.3.4. Regulatory pitfalls
From the authors’ experience, there are a number of regulatory
pitfalls where the relationship between the water services
provider and the regulator may become too comfortable, poor, or
where it may break down altogether.
3.4.1. Bypassing the regulator. On a concession in Latin
America the private concessionaire bypassed the regulator in
order to deal with government directly. As a consequence the
credibility of the regulator has been undermined.
3.4.2. Distrust of foreign management. A management
contract in the Caribbean was frustrated and terminated early
owing to antagonism among members of the supervising board
caused by the presence of a foreign private manager.
3.4.3. Lack of finance. One PSP arrangement failed because
the promised donor funding did not materialise. This meant that
the operator was unable to implement the investment
programme.
3.4.4. Failure of the state to fulfil its obligations. The
operator appointed for a PSP contract in an African country was
unable to deliver the agreed performance improvements because
the state-owned asset holding company failed to deliver its
contractual commitment to fund the renewal of major plant.
3.4.5. Regulatory capture. Where the regulator’s sphere of
activity is confined to a single supplier, or where external
pressure and accountability are absent, the regulator can become
over-familiar with the interests of one party. An example of such
an arrangement existed in southern Africa where the private
operator (responsible for water distribution to consumers)
depended upon bulk supplies from several state-owned water
boards. The boards operated autonomously with little regulatory
pressure and as effective monopolies with a free hand in setting
tariffs and standards. This undermined the performance of the
PSP operator.
3.4.6. Micro-management. There are examples where the
regulatory/supervisory body has become involved too closely in
day-to-day management of the utility. This hampers both the
operator’s progress and regulatory process. Furthermore, by
blurring the role of ‘provider’ and ‘client’, the regulator maysitive regulation for water services Bateman et al. 179
180become unable to enforce the contractual requirements
effectively.
3.4.7. Political interference. There is an inherent danger that
political imperatives will come into conflict with the principles of
good regulation. In the UK political imperatives have prevailed
on several occasions.3.5. A delicate balancing act
In practice a pragmatic balance has to be struck by the regulator
between the various pressures. In the early days of a PSP regime
the regulator should typically focus on the following key issues
(a) establishing a professional working relationship with
the private operator that strikes a balance between
antagonism and being involved too closely
(b) adhering to the legal and contractual powers and
responsibilities described in the law, licence or contract,
while at the same time focussing on key issues that affect
customers and potential customers
(c) establishing numerical bases for determining whether levels
of service are improving or getting worse
(d) reviewing and updating the operator’s plan periodically to
ensure that it is always relevant—especially in relation to
connections, expansion and provision of new services
(including those to low-income customers).4. STRATEGIC PLANNING OF WATER SERVICES
In theory, the process of implementing PSP provides an
opportunity for strategic planning of water services. However,
the authors’ experience in PSP in low-income environments
suggests that such planning is not always effective. There may
be insufficient data and a lack of expertise; this together with
entrenched attitudes can result in crisis management rather
than properly based strategic planning. The base-line plans
upon which contracts are founded, therefore, are frequently
ill informed or subject to many caveats such that they
are unreliable.4.1. Updating strategic plans
A further difficulty in strategic planning of water services is that
such plans can become out of date very quickly owing to material
changes in supply and/or demand, in demographics, service
standards or operating cost. As a result, it is generally accepted
that rolling plans are needed with a major update every three to
five years.
This creates particular difficulties for regulators, as each revised
plan has a cost and tariff implication requiring regulatory (and
occasionally political) approval. Experience indicates that tariff
negotiations present the greatest potential for political
interference and disputes between the parties and can distract
from issues such as service provision to low-income customers.
Key regulatory issues to be addressed in approving updated
strategic plans and reviewing tariffs include
(a) achieving a balance between inflow and outflow of funds
(b) taking account of the amount of funding available from
external sourcesWater Management 158 Issue WM4 Socially sensitiv(c) striking a balance between price increases and service
enhancements or expansion
(d) setting achievable efficiency improvement targets over the
period
(e) setting standards and establishing the cost impact of any
service enhancements.
In assessing and approving updated strategic plans, the regulator
may also need to recognise and adjust for the tendency of
operators to seek fail-safe, reliable solutions at a higher-cost in
preference to lower-cost (greater risk) alternatives. Unless
corrected, this tendency can over-state prices and cause
regulators to lower their horizons for service enhancements or
expansion of services to low-income areas.5. PROJECTS ANALYSIS
In order to gather more evidence on regulation and the poor the
authors examined a number of past projects and noted recurring
themes relating to services to the poor. Table 1 summarises the
authors’ findings.6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
This paper has presented some general regulatory principles that
seek to guarantee water and sanitation services for all including
the poor. It also indicated how institutional and information
constraints, together with an early focus on achieving a balanced
water sector strategy, can distract regulatory attention from
improving service provision in low-income areas.
The key regulatory functions that impact upon poor customers
have been identified, and proposals made for necessary
regulatory actions to promote improved water services to
low-income customers.6.1. Planning
(a) Participate in and provide information to other government
agencies to develop a pro-poor water policy.
(b) Negotiate and agree with the regulated utilities appropriate
service levels and priorities for service improvements in
low-income areas.
(c) Develop a reporting regime for assessing the regulated
utilities’ progress against agreed targets.
(d) Promote competition and issue licences to new entrants or
secondary providers.
(e) Periodically agree medium-term outputs, funding and tariffs
with the regulated utilities.
( f ) Capacity building for stakeholders, to empower them to
negotiate with service providers.6.2. Enforcement
(a) Monitor the regulated utilities’ performance against agreed
targets.
(b) Invoke regulatory actions in the event of performance
failure.
(c) Apply incentive and penalty mechanisms to reflect the
regulated utilities’ progress in achieving targets.
(d) Liaise with other government agencies and support other
initiatives for improving services to low-income areas.e regulation for water services Bateman et al.
No. Project
Is the regulator
independent?
Is regulation
fixed to the
terms of the
PSP contract?
Is there flexibility
for pro-poor
regulation?
How is
information
gathered for
those without
a supply?
What authority
does the regulator
have for
pro-poor issues?
1 Buenos Aires Water and
Sewerage Concession
Yes Yes — Part of 30-year
programme
Needs
government
support
2 Guyana—water and
sanitation sector study
Yes Yes Not yet in place Not yet in place Not yet in place
3 Nigeria Water: PSP options
study
No — — — —
4 Greater Negombo (Sri
Lanka) water sector PSP
Yes Work on-going—not yet defined
5 Astana Water and
Environment
Development Project
Yes No Probably not Via elected
representatives
Can limit charges
to poor
households
6 Zaparozhzhia Municipal
Water Service
Development, Ukraine
Yes No
7 Rostov-on-Don Strategic
Plan, Russia
Yes No
8 Chisinau Water and
Wastewater
Rehabilitation Project,
Moldova
Yes No
9 Ukraine Municipal Utilities
Development
Programme, Ukraine
Yes No
Note: — uncertain or not defined
Table 1. Regulation and the poor—summary of recurring themes6.3. Consultation
(a) Actively engage with customers, including those in
low-income areas, to assess and agree on service levels
and priorities for implementing improvements.
(b) Consult with customers in low-income areas to ensure that
standards reflect their needs and preferences.
(c) Consult with customers more generally over whether current
standards are defined adequately andmeasured appropriately.
(d) Consult over whether prices reflect service levels and
services delivered.6.4. Customer representation
(a) Create mechanisms for effective customer representation
(b) Promote the interests of customers in low-income areas.
(c) Settle disputes between customers and the regulated utility.
(d) Protect customers by setting prices appropriate to service
levels and services delivered.
In the context of private sector participation, the needs of
the poor can be neglected and their voices not heard. AnWhat do you think?
To comment on this paper, please email up to 500 words to the edi
Proceedings journals rely entirely on contributions sent in by civil eng
should be 2000–5000 words long, with adequate illustrations and re
guidelines and further details.
Water Management 158 Issue WM4 Socially senefficient and appropriate regulatory regime can ensure that
low-income customers are socially included and given
proper consideration.7. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
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